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UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAWS AND
INTERNATIONAL TRANSFERS OF TECHNOLOGY-
TUE GOVERNMENT VIEW
JOEL DAVIDOW*
I RECALL that early in my career in the Antitrust Division one of
my colleagues who attended a settlement conference in an interna-
tional patent and know-how licensing case, came out of it and said,
"You know, listening to the discussion was a lot like following a
three-dimensional chess game."
I recalled that remark as I tried to analyze this topic, and I now
think perhaps the subject is akin to a five-dimensional chess game.
Starting with a body of quite old American law, which deals with the
protection of the patent right and the various statutes that have
enforced the constitutional provision providing for a patent system and
the encouragement of invention,' you superimpose the Sherman Anti-
trust Act.2 Add, perhaps as a side issue, the common law and various
state laws concerning trade secrets and ancillary restraints. 3 Mix in
federal or state law on trademarks, 4 realizing that in international
patent licensing you may have to deal with the patent laws of many
other countries together with varying foreign trademark laws;5 and
finally you must consider the usual international problems of jurisdic-
tion and extraterritoriality. 6
When I talk to classes about this there is usually a student who asks
something like, "Well, what if I have an American patent, trademark
and know-how license with a British sub-license, and I own American
rights and the British rights; I license the Englishman and we have a
restriction in the contract which is valid under English law but might
be illegal under American antitrust law?" Normally I answer wisely
* A.B. 1960, Princeton University; LL.B. 1963, Columbia University; Chief, Foreign Com-
merce Section, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice; Adjunct Professor, Georgetown
Law School; Lecturer, Catholic University Law School. The views expressed are entirely
personal and do not necessarily represent or coincide with those of any governmental agency.
1. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03 (1970). See discussion in Graham v. John
Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-12 (1966).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (1970).
3. See generally Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974); Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Goodwin, Misappropriation: A Retreat from the Federal
Patent and Copyright Preemption Doctrine, 43 Fordham L. Rev. 239 (1974).
4. The relevant federal law is the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 et seq. (1970).
5. See, e.g., John Lecroy & Son, Inc. v. Langis Foods, Ltd., 376 F. Supp. 962 (D.D.C.
1974).
6. See generally W. Fugate, Foreign Commerce and the Antitrust Laws 29-143 (2d ed. 1973).
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that I cannot answer that question without a month of factual and
legal investigation.
Let me start, first, with some of the reasons why the problem does
not lend itself to simple answers. One qualification, which patent
lawyers are fond of stressing and which an economist can see most
clearly, is that the concept "patent monopoly" and the words "antitrust
monopoly," though related, are different. Antitrust philosophy started
in England, I believe, with a suspicion of state-granted monopoly
rights and the abuse thereof which has never entirely left the system. A
patent, of course, is a state-granted monopoly right.
However, the idea of a monopoly in antitrust is to some extent
related to the economic concept of a significant and relevant market.
Obviously, not all patents are economic monopolies in any meaningful
sense. One can illustrate this point easily. If I were to invent a
cigarette lighter which could be worked with the toe, rather than the
finger, I could probably get a patent on it if no one else had ever
thought of it. But since there are at least a thousand other varieties of
devices which will light a cigarette, the economic importance of my
monopoly right would be minimal, and one would probably be indif-
ferent to the way I dealt with it.
Thus, antitrust really concerns itself with those particular instances
where the patent or trademark right coincides with an industry or with
a product of great commercial significance; in other words, where a
substitute technology is usually not immediately available at equiva-
lent costs. An exception is the case of patent fraud, which may well be
an antitrust offense regardless of the economic importance of the
subject of the patent. 7
Another peculiarity of -the patent right is that it is strictly territorial,
at least at present 8-that is, an American patent provides a monopoly
only in America. Consequently, if you are going to use the American
patent right to hold a monopoly anywhere else, you can not achieve
that under the American patent system. You achieve it essentially by
foreign registration and/or by means of some type of contract. But, of
course, the legality of contracts has normally been governed, among
other things, by the antitrust laws.
Thus, although antitrust rules have sometimes been expressed in
terms of codes of conduct, with specific "do's" and "don'ts" about what
kinds of patent licensing practices may or may not be legal, I want to
stress that, in applying the antitrust laws to patents, before condemn-
ing a restriction or practice, we usually first determine whether the
7. See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965);
Stem, A Future Look at Patent Fraud and Antitrust Laws, 52 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 3 (1970).
8. See Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972).
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patent, know-how or trademark is of commercial or economic sig-
nificance over any period of time.
In trying to work through this difficult area, my premise is that the
application of the antitrust laws should be sensible and consistent. I
find that it all culminates in essentially three antitrust issues or
dangers; perhaps under these, one can make some sense of it. We
center on three analytical issues: whether there has been over-
extension of the technology right; what subdivisions of the right should
be permissible; and whether exchanges or combinations of rights may
raise cartel dangers. Although I think that, to a large extent, the third
area is the most important, the other two are not to be slighted.
Over-extension of a technology right assumes that a person armed
with a governmentally protected monopoly is like someone with a
dangerous animal, and thus must be subject to strict responsibilities. I
think the most dangerous over-extension is to obtain the legal
monopoly fraudulently. This has become an important area of Ameri-
can antitrust litigation. 9
If you can convince the Patent Office to give you a monopoly when,
in fact, your product should not be patentable because some other
person has already discovered it, you achieve the ultimate antitrust
coup. You have a legal monopoly, and you have governmental protec-
tion against new competition. In United States v. Union Camp
Corp., 1 0 a company which obtained a patent monopoly had discovered
during the application process that a competitor already had developed
the technology. Since this rendered the product unpatentable, the
company made an agreement with the competitor to share the
monopoly with him if he would never disclose the fact that it wasn't
patentable. We proceeded against them for a criminal, i.e., inten-
tional, violation of the Sherman Act's section 2 prohibition against
monopolization, and obtained pleas in the suit.
Prevention of fraudulent acquisition of patent rights may be more
important under United States law than under foreign law, because
once the right is established we generally do not police profits, and we
generally do not require licensing-with some exceptions. I1 Since we
do neither of those things, and thus essentially allow a monopoly
return to the inventor of a product of commercial significance,
it becomes very important to determine whether the patent was valid
in the first place. Because of this, we have had additional engraftings
on the element of validity. One enlargement, as I have mentioned, is
9. See, e.g., In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 317, 320-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
10. 1969 Trade Cas. 72,689 (E.D. Va.).




the doctrine that fraudulently obtaining a patent is an antitrust
violation-a monopolization or an attempt to monopolize.
Secondly, an agreement with the licensee that he will not challenge
the validity of the patent has been ruled to be against the public policy
of the United States and unenforceable. The rationale behind this is
that it is the public, not merely the licensee, which is injured if an
invalid patent continues in its monopoly operation simply because of
an agreement that someone directly benefiting from rights under the
patent will not challenge its validity. 12
Thirdly, we have developed a doctrine that misuse of the patent in
an antitrust sense may cause it either to be invalidated, 13 or at least
may require licensing or even royalty-free licensing. 14 All of these
stem from our policy against excessive or abusive use of the patent
monopoly right.
Also included within the concept of over-extension of the right, I
think, are all the variety of practices which usually go under the
heading of tie-ins. In the United States as well as in many other
countries and under a number of international codes, it is usually held
to be illegal and improper for a person holding a valuable patent right
to require, as a condition of licensing that right, that the licensee take
a second patent, 15 a package of patents, 16 related technology, 17
another product that is separate,' 8 agree not to deal in the products or
technology of a second company,' 9 exclusively grant back any im-
12. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670-71 (1969).
13. United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 410 U.S. 52, 58-60 (1973).
14. Id. at 59; Besser Mfg. Co. v. United States, 343 U.S. 444 (1952).
15. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 392 (1947) (license to show feature films may not
be conditioned on acceptance of license to show lesser grade films).
16. American Securit Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 268 F.2d 769, 777-78 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 902 (1959) (license to use glass tempering machine may not be packaged so that
licensee must pay fixed royalty for use of all licensor's patents).
17. Rockform Corp. v. Acitelli-Standard Concrete Wall, Inc., 367 F.2d 678 (6th Cir. 1966)
(various building construction patents may not be licensed as one system-the most Important
patent should be separable from the group).
18. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (lease of patented salt
processing machines may not be conditioned on purchase of lessor's salt and other unpatented
products).
19. McCullough v. Kammerer Corp., 166 F.2d 759 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 813
(1948) (license to use patented pipe cutter may not prohibit licensee from using any other pipe
cutter); National Lockwasher Co. v. George K. Garrett Co., 137 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1943) (license
to manufacture patented washers may not be conditioned on licensee's agreement not to
manufacture possible competing goods not covered by the patent); Park-In Theatres, Inc. v.
Paramount-Richards Theatres, 90 F. Supp. 730, 734 (D. Del.), affd per curiam, 185 F.2d 407 (3d
Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 950 (1951) (license to construct, use, or operate patented
drive-in theatre could not be conditioned on licensee's agreement not to construct other types of
open-air theatres not covered by the patent).
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provement made, 20 or pay royalties on non-patented products. 2 1
There are, I think, more variations on this, but it seems to me they all
go back to the leverage or tie-in question, essentially to the argument
that there has been an over-extension of the right by requiring this
additional condition.
There is considerable writing on the economic aspect of the subject,
and many economists have taken the view that this rather wide-scale
condemnation of tie-ins is probably a little overzealous. 22 These
economists argue that if the patent is valid, if the monopoly is
significant, and if the product is sold in a non-price controlled
market-that is, a market which is not in a regulated industry or not
in an economy which has price control-the person with the patent,
trademark or trade secret right, if prohibited from all these combina-
tions of products or services, will simply charge more. They argue that
there really is no economic difference whether the patentee charges a
royalty of ten dollars on condition that you buy the raw materials from
him, or he charges a royalty of twelve dollars because you don't buy
raw material or parts from him.
Despite this argument, which has appeal in some cases, I think that
the tendency of the law is probably going to continue, or perhaps even
accelerate, in the direction of condemning virtually all tie-in practices.
It appears that the economists have not convinced judges, antitrust
plaintiffs and other affected groups that the perpetrators of tie-ins
really could exact an equal return solely by raising license fees or
royalties. I believe that another reason for this trend is that antitrust,
besides its direct economic goals, involves fair competition and equity
values. The image is always portrayed of the poor fellow who happens
to sell only the tied product, and who is suddenly losing his customers
to the person who held the patent and who engaged in the tie-in. The
general feeling is that it is unfair, simply unjust-regardless of whether
there is any economic cost-to allow the person who holds the patent
or the trademark to use it to take business away from or deny business
opportunities to people who thought they were selling a non-patented
20. United States v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, 1970 Trade Cas. S 73,015
(W.D. Wis.) (consent decree) (licensee cannot be required to assign to licensor any future patents
or technology relating to improvements in the patent licensed). But see Transparent-Wrap Mach.
Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637, 648 (1947) (license of wrapping machine not per se
illegal when conditioned on assignment of improvements to licensor).
21. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 136 (1969) (licensee of
television and radio patents cannot be required to pay licensor a percentage royalty on sales of his
other products).
22. See Bowman, Tying Agreements and the Leverage Problem, 67 Yale L.J. 19 (1957);
Markovitz, Tie-ins, Reciprocity and the Leverage Theory, Pt. I, 76 Yale L.J. 1397 (1967), PL If,
80 Yale L.J. 195 (1970).
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product, whether it be the ingredients in Chicken Delight, or the little
paper cards that go in IBM machines. 23 Moreover, in the real world
there may be many reasons why the patent owner could not exploit his
monopoly right fully if denied the opportunity for indirect compensa-
tion through tie-ins.
Lastly, another unwarranted extension of the patent monopoly is to
seek to use it to restrict the disposal of the goods on resale. This runs
contrary to well-settled law that the monopoly is exhausted on first
sale, and to the holdings in the Schwinn24 and Glaxo25 cases that
restraints on resale violate the Sherman Act.
The second broad category of patent antitrust issues concerns sub-
division of the monopoly right. For example, a company which has
the sole right to manufacture and sell a product may license one
company to sell only west of the Mississippi, another to sell only east
of the Mississippi, and still a third only for medical use, thus giving
rise to several territorial or field of use restrictions. The classic position
of the patent bar, and the position of some courts, has been that if you
have a whole monopoly you can keep half and license away half. The
question is asked why the public is any worse off if two people share a
monopoly than if one person simply exploits it. It is also sometimes
suggested that territorial or field use divisions aid small businesses
which cannot afford to develop all territories or uses. 26
Under this view it would never be illegal simply to subdivide the
right. Of course, there are some cases which seem to suggest that the
Supreme Court of the United States once accepted this theory, 27
particularly as to field-of-use restrictions, although most modern writers
indicate that the liquidity issue is in grave doubt at present. To the
Antitrust Division, the major antitrust problem arising out of subdivi-
sion of a monopoly right is that it may create a cartel among the
licensees, as in the United States Gypsum28 and Masonite29 cases.
23. Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955
(1972); IBM v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
24. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
25. United States v. Glaxo Group, Ltd., 302 F. Supp. 1, 8-11 (D.D.C. 1969).
26. See, e.g., Frost, Restrictions on Field of Use and Territories, 42 ABA Antitrust Section
633, 637 (1973); Gibbons, Domestic Territorial Restrictions in Patent Transactions and the
Antitrust Laws, 34 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 893, 896 (1966).
27. General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175, 181, affd on
rehearing, 305 U.S. 124, 127 (1938). A chemical license in the commercial field, prohibiting
reformulation for use in the home gardening field, was sustained in Chemagro Corp, v. Universal
Chem. Co., 244 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. Tex. 1965). The government's subsequent challenge of the
Chemagro licenses was settled by consent decree banning the challenged practice. United States
v. Farbenfabriken Bayer A.G., 1969 Trade Cas. $ 72,918 (D.D.C.).
28. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948).
29. United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942).
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Also, there are significant differences in analyzing the territorial sub-
division question as it applies to foreign rather than domestic com-
merce. Domestically, section 261 of the Patent Act,30 sanctions territo-
rial assignments for patents, though it does not speak expressly of
licensing. Thus, it is debatable whether this section creates an implied
statutory antitrust exemption for territorial allocation within the
United States.3 ' Regardless, the section would not apply in other
countries or in foreign commerce.
One court of appeals, in Dunlop Co. v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., -3 2 reasoned
that if territories can be divided in the United States it obviously can
be done abroad. With all due deference, I do not believe that this
follows obviously at all. As noted, section 261 of the Act does not apply
abroad. Moreover, the same types of patent rights do not necessarily
exist abroad-rather they depend on whatever system each nation has
and how it has been utilized.
The other peculiarity of territorial subdivisions internationally is
that there are at least three different ways to effectuate them. You can
enforce them, in a sense, simply by granting rights under a foreign
patent while retaining your own under the United States law, and then
suing for infringement if the foreigner sells here. You can employ
section 1337 of the Tariff Act 33 to exclude the goods; or lastly you can
attempt to enforce them by putting a territorial subdivision in the
contract and then suing for breach of the contract if the foreign
licensee sells here.
The Antitrust Division has said that because you have the first two
rights, and because those are limited by a number of public policy
considerations, the third practice, the use of a contractual agreement,
will be looked at with great suspicion.
The third major area of antitrust concern in international patent
licensing is the cartel danger that arises from various forms of combi-
nation of industrial property rights. For instance as the Besser34 case
held, by buying up or combining competing patent rights firms can
create a broad monopoly that is clearly illegal.
Cross-licensing among actual or potential competitors which results
in a consistent pattern of market allocation may be looked at as an
agreement between those competitors that creates a cartel, particularly
if it relates to future patents and has broad economic effects. Such
30. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1970).
31. The argument that section 261 does not authorize territorial restrictions is explicated in
Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76
Yale L.J. 267, 349-52 (1966).
32. 484 F.2d 407, 417-18 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974).
33. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970).
34. Besser Mfg. Co. -v. United States, 343 U.S. 444 (1952).
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conduct was condemned in the National Lead35 and ICI36 cases,
involving international licensing.
Another form of illegal combination is an agreement between one
competitor and another as to whether or how to license a potential
competitor of either. In other words, A says to B, "I'll license or
cross-license you if you agree not to give a license to C." This is almost
certainly an antitrust violation, and would be so considered under the
usual conspiracy or cartel law, despite the fact that patents or
trademarks are involved. 37
This certainly does not mean that all or most patent licenses are
illegal, or are likely to be. International licensing situations are most
often examined as relatively standard antitrust cases in terms of
possible elimination of actual or potential competition, or the occur-
rence of particular types of unfair or unwarranted conduct. Most
licensing arrangements are unobjectionable, and suits in this area have
been relatively rare.
I have attempted by means of this analysis to help you to under-
stand how we make the often difficult determination whether an
international licensing arrangement is legally acceptable, and I hope it
has persuaded you that our enforcement approach is as consistent and
balanced as can reasonably be achieved in a complex field.
35. United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
36. United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
37. See United States v. Krasnov, 143 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Pa. 1956), aff'd per curiam, 355
U.S. 5 (1957).
